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Abstract 
What effect does the threat of expropriation have on resource extraction? Much of the economic literature suggests 
that uncertainty reduces investment, but the theory of risk-induced extraction suggests the opposite. In this paper, 
we test this theory in the context of political violence, which poses a real threat of state destabilization and violent 
expropriation of property rights. Facing this uncertainty, we find that oil producers in the Middle East and North 
Africa increase oil production in response to political violence. This finding has important negative consequences 
for the world in terms of climate change and demonstrates a previously untested mechanism through which 
exhaustible resource supply is flooding the market. 




“It is a very uncomfortable situation to produce oil 
with guns and we don't like it.” 
– Ian McCredie, head of Global Security Services 
at Shell International.2 
 
1. Introduction 
How does the market react to the violent threat of 
expropriation? A growing literature suggests that 
investment and economic activity slow in the face of 
rising uncertainty, but this finding may not apply to 
exhaustible resources such as oil. Faced with the 
threat to “use it or lose it,” oil producers may drill 
even faster. This paper tests a hypothesis of risk-
induced extraction due to “violent Hotelling 
pressures” and finds evidence to support it. Political 
violence—and especially that directly targeting the 
institutions of the state—tends to lead to increased 
oil production among a population of national oil 
monopolies in the Middle East and North Africa. 
When their oil is at risk, resource owners do not wait 
for the threat to pass. They act: They extract. 
 
1 ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: aworlando@cpp.edu (A.W. Orlando).  
1. Both authors contributed equally to all roles in this research project and paper. 
2 Quoted in Burns and Catan (2005) 
The economic logic of risk-induced extraction rests 
on well-worn foundations. Hotelling (1931) first 
articulated a decision rule by which owners of 
exhaustible fossil fuel resources would maximize 
the net present value (NPV) of all cash flows over 
the life of their asset. Owners extract reserve 
resources in order of accessibility, removing the 
easiest and cheapest first, and they smooth 
extraction as a function of prevailing discount rates 
to take full advantage of available returns to capital. 
Long (1975) extends Hotelling's prediction of 
owners’ behavior into contexts where owners suffer 
increasing chances of losing their property in future 
periods, arguing that they will rationally increase 
short-term output to hedge against uncertain future 
cash flows. 
Sinn (2008) extends the study of risk-induced 
responses of fixed-resource owners to examine 
accelerated extraction due to policy threats. Sinn 
anticipates a “Green Paradox” arising when 
policymakers signal future carbon taxes, such that 
interventions planned to reduce 
emissions counterintuitively spur additional production of subsoil car-
bon (Sinn, 2012). In addition to calling attention to a novel driver of pro-
duction, the Green Paradox literature calls on energy economists to
incorporate rates of both carbon extraction and sequestration into
global utility models and better attend to feedbacks in the Earth system
that magnify long-term impacts of near-term emissions (van der Ploeg,
2013).3
While the Green Paradox literature has seen empirical support from
longitudinal studies of extractive investments by U.S. oil majors
(e.g., Merrill, 2018), the field has restricted its attention to risk-
induced extraction based on policy. This has left a gap in the field of en-
ergy economics concerning risk-induced extraction based on political
violence. We begin to engage this gap in a time of widespread violence
in an increasingly unstable Middle East, where civil wars in Syria, Libya,
Yemen and Sudan, civil unrest and violence in Egypt, the rise of ISIS, and
the fracturing of Iraq have cast a pall of uncertainty over regional re-
source owners. In sync with rising academic attention to the likelihood
that climate stress increases political violence and destabilizes states
(Hsiang et al., 2011, 2013; Burke et al., 2015; Kelley et al., 2015;
Schleussner et al., 2016; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016), we extend the
study of risk-induced accelerations in fossil fuel production to the case
of political violence, closing the feedback loop and casting new light
on a critical but as of yet under-explored vector of climate forcing.
We advance the violent Hotelling pressure hypothesis that national
oil monopolies respond to increasing political violence by increasing
production, extracting oil sooner rather than later to leave fewer re-
serves to rising risks to future expropriation. We test this hypothesis
by combining panel data of monthly oil production for a population of
national oil monopolies in the Middle East and North Africa with data
on the locations, targets, and consequences of every reported instance
of political violence from 1996 to 2014. We select national oil monopo-
lies on purpose, as they have significantly less latitude than transna-
tional firms to exit a deteriorating context by liquidating local
holdings and moving operations overseas.
We find increasing political violence exhibits a positive and signifi-
cant effect on petroleum production of national oil monopolies. We
use lagged treatment variables to reveal that this effect is persistent
over time, from 6 months to 15 months after the violence occurs. Ro-
bustness tests show these results are unlikely to be driven by reverse
causality, endogeneity concerns, contagion effects, or military exigency.
We confirm the violent Hotelling pressures hypothesis by showing that
these effects are driven particularly by attacks against the police and the
government, exactly those institutions that uphold secure property
rights and mitigate risks of expropriation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly
reviews the theory of risk-induced extraction and how itmay be applied
to political violence through a hypothesis of violent Hotelling pressures.
Section III describes our cross-national dataset of oil production and po-
litical violence and proposes a methodology to test the theory.
Section IV documents our findings, with multiple robustness tests to
verify our results. Section V concludes with policy implications and av-
enues for future research.
2. The theory
2.1. Climate change and the rate of extraction
Climate change is among the most profound challenges of our time.
While exacerbating heatwaves, sandstorms, hurricanes, drought, and
floods across the globe, climate change threatens to “auto-accelerate”
as the saturation of oceanic heat sinks coincides with accelerating feed-
back loops in the planet's climate system (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2014).4 Runaway climate change threatens wealth
andwelfare destruction on a global scale within the lifetimes of our col-
lege students, who clamor for action to mitigate global greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions (Saad and Jones, 2016; Bendell, 2018). The majority
of these emissions arise from fossil fuels that, once taken from the
ground, are inevitably sold tomarket.When their hydrocarbons are bro-
ken down to release energy through combustion, their carbon content
escapes into the atmosphere. Given the magnitude of the unaddressed
problem of global warming (Sanderson and Knutti, 2017), economists
must increase attention to dynamics impacting the speed with which
owners dig fossil fuels from the earth.
One of the most important metrics by which policy scholars assess
the problem of GHG emissions is the rate of extraction of fossil fuels.
Once taken from the ground, fossil fuels are sold to the market, and
their carbon content escapes into the atmosphere during the release of
energy fromhydrocarbonsduringcombustion. Thus, economists andso-
ciologists closely attend to those economic and social dynamics that im-
pact the speedwithwhichowners of fossil fuels dig them from theearth.
2.2. The theory of risk-induced extraction
Consider an oil well with a unit price of p0 upon discovery. Its owner
must decide howmany units to extract now and how many to leave in
the ground to extract at a later time t. If the oil is extracted now, the
owner can invest the proceeds at the discount rate r, yielding a contin-
uously compounded value of p0ert. In equilibrium, the owner must be
indifferent between extracting the marginal unit and waiting for it to
appreciate, leading to the famous rule that Hotelling (1931) established
in his classic article on “exhaustible resources,”
pt ¼ p0ert: ð1Þ







or else the owner would have an incentive to shift capital into themore
profitable investment.5
In a competitive market, the resource owners take this price as
given. They can only choose the quantity they extract at a given time,
q ¼ f p, tð Þ, ð3Þ
in order to maximize the net present value (NPV) of their remaining re-





Equivalently, we can say that q represents the extraction of S,
q ¼ − dS
dt
: ð5Þ
The higher this rate of extraction, the more difficult it becomes to
mitigate climate change. Assuming the typical demand functional
3 A few pertinent examples include albedo loss from sea ice melt, carbon emissions
from boreal forest dieback, and methane releases from warming tundra.
4 Consider “albedo” (reflectivity) loss fromvegetative change inwarming boreal forests,
methane emissions of melting permafrost, and albedo loss from ice melt (III et al., 2005;
Shuman et al., 2011).
5 The Hotelling rule has a long history of providing valuable insights in the energy eco-
nomics literature (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013). It has not been
universally accepted, however; Reynolds and Baek (2012), for example, argue that thedis-
count rate does not affect prices directly because market participants do not have full
knowledge of supply and demand in the real world where all reserves are not discovered.
They do not predict the effect on production, though, where more recent empirical work
suggests that the many firms' behavior is consistent with the rule (Güntner, 2019).
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form where fp < 0 and fpp > 0, it becomes clear that lower prices accel-
erate extraction by inducing higher demand—and so, increase the envi-
ronmental damage.
What happens as property rights become insecure? Imagine, for ex-
ample, that some exogenous force increasingly threatens the ruling re-
gime. The owner could lose their resource in the future. Sinn (2008)
models this regime's ownership of the oil with a survival function,
e−πt, where π is the constant probability of expropriation at any given
moment. This threat is an increasing function of the severity of political
violence, and it reduces the expected value of the oil asset. If it is ex-
tracted now, it can still be invested at r, but if it stays in the ground, its
expected return is r − π. As a result, the owner is only indifferent be-
tween extracting and waiting if the asset appreciates at r + π to com-
pensate for the added risk,
pt ¼ p0e rþπð Þt : ð6Þ
Since higher future prices lead to lower extraction, we know that q
will decline faster along this steeper price appreciation path as demand
declinesmore quickly. Yet, S does not change: This is the crucial distinc-
tion with exhaustible resources. As Hotelling famously said, “the indef-
inite maintenance of a steady rate of production is a physical
impossibility.” Given a relatively fixed S, if less is extracted later, more
must be extracted earlier. This prediction motivates our first two hy-
potheses, which collectively seek to assess the impacts of increasingly
severe political violence on extraction:
• H1.a - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising frequency of political violence.
• H1.b - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising lethality of political violence.
A growing body of evidence has revealed that increasing insecurity
of property rights—from wars, international crises, rare disasters, and
other political risks—does indeed have a direct effect on oil prices, but
the effect on oil production remains an unanswered question for this
study to address (Kollias et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016; Omar et al.,
2017; Demirer et al., 2018). Furthermore, previous studies have focused
most of their attention at the macro-level of analysis, where global oil
prices are set, while our data will allow us to drill down to the micro-
level where firm decisions about production are made.
In considering patterns by which these firms confront change in
their political environment, it is important to underscore the relatively
fixed nature of energy holdings. While national oil monopolies may in-
crease (decrease) the recoverable portion of their stock through tech-
nology investment (disinvestment), these firms regularly rely on
immobile and illiquid assets to generate profits compared to other in-
dustries. These assets include not only their subsoil deposits, but also
their specific investments in local political connections, heavy equip-
ment, transportation networks, and refining facilities. Thus, national
oil companies should prove particularly vulnerable to violent Hotelling
pressures as compared to more mobile organizations with lower fixed
capital costs.
As a result, where political conditions subject market actors to an
erosion of property rights or higher expropriation risks, deteriorating
security is particularly likely to encourage national oil companies to dis-
count the value of their reserve holdings.Where political violence raises
thedanger of a newauthority or cripples the incumbent authority's abil-
ity to ensure private property rights, national oil companies should
prove particularly apt to foreshorten extraction paths to maximize
NPV under a higher risk-adjusted discount rate. To test the implications
of this theory, we anticipate that accelerated extraction responses will
be associated with violence targeting state institutions specifically
tasked with ensuring property rights, such as government and police:
• H2.a - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising frequency of political violence that targets the police.
• H2.b - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising lethality of political violence that targets the police.
• H3.a - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising frequency of political violence that targets the government.
• H3.b - National oil companies will increase production in response to
rising lethality of political violence that targets the government.
This theory of risk-induced extraction runs counter to recent work
examining firm incentives to reduce investment in the face of uncer-
tainty. When investments are difficult to reverse, it often makes finan-
cial sense for firms to adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy in lieu of
potentially imprudent gambles on future conditions. Higher uncertainty
increases the option value of future investment to a degree thatmay ex-
ceed the value of a current outlay, particularly when the expected value
of future information exceeds the cost of deferring (Bernanke, 1983;
Bloom, 2009).
Firmsmay also rationally postpone investment if they arefinancially
constrained. Constraintmayprevent them fromborrowing at affordable
rates to survive bad states of the world. Under rising uncertainty, credit
markets discount firms' collateral and increase credit spreads to hedge
against the increased risk of default. As a result, firms may elect to
pass on new investments until uncertainty recedes (Christiano et al.,
2014).
To our knowledge, none of these theories have been tested in the
context of exhaustible resources such as oil. However, evidence sug-
gests that political violence represents an important source of uncer-
tainty in fossil fuel markets. Violence impedes the free flow of
business by breaking supply chains, disrupting key operations, scaring
off customers, and raising capital costs (Czinkota et al., 2010). Political
violence decreases firms' survival rates and pushes them to prioritize
short-term operational planning overmore comprehensive strategic ef-
forts (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). More generally, violence undermines the
system of property rights and the rule of law that support the transition
from elite-dominated natural states tomore efficientmarket economies
(North, 1990).
Oil companies take the risk of state destabilization seriously,
crediting political violence for having “led to a booming industry in pri-
vate security companies,” aswell as forcing companies to shut downop-
erations and evacuate staff when violence becomes too severe (Burns
and Catan, 2005). Lambrechts and Blomquist (2016) provide further ev-
idence that oil companies have been taking “political-security risk”
more seriously in recent years, dedicating an increasing proportion of
firm resources to risk mitigation and physical security.
In contrast to models of strategic risk management, and in line with
our analysis of violent Hotelling pressures, we anticipate that rising
levels of political violence in the environment will drive national oil
companies to accelerate the extraction of fossil fuels. Furthermore, we
expect firm responses will be strongest when violence is bothmore fre-
quent and more severe, and when that violence targets public institu-
tions tasked with the enforcement of property rights.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Production, violence, and the monopolies of the Middle East and North
Africa
Our hypotheses of violent Hotelling pressures suggest we should see
oil monopoly countries increasing production after events of more se-
vere political violence, proportional to the frequency and lethality of
the events. In preparing empirical tests, we define political violence as
politically-motivated violence by non-state actors (Martin, 2010;
Richardson, 2006). Building on the classic approach of Davis and
Weinstein (2002), Brakman et al. (2004), and Dell and Querubin
(2018), we operationalize the frequency and lethality of political vio-
lence based respectively on the number of violent attacks during a
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given period (attacks) and the number of deaths inflicted by those at-
tacks on their targets (kills), testing our hypotheses by estimating the
impact of violence onmonopolies' oil production in the following period.
We proceed to test our hypotheses with data on political violence and
national oil monopoly production in the region of the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA).
MENA provides a perfect context in which to conduct our analysis
for several reasons. First, the MENA states hold more than 57% of global
reserves. Further, oil production within the region is generally well re-
ported by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
among whom the largest deposits lie in Saudi Arabia and neighboring
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and UAE, as well as Libya and Qatar. Table 1 reports
an illustrative snapshot of reserve data for the region with useful com-
parisons to leader US energy majors.
Second, we focus on the MENA region because it suffers from high
levels of political violence, providing an appropriate context in which
political violence presentsmaterial likelihood of disrupting the property
rights of national oil companies. By way of global comparison, Table 2
presents inter-regional data on political violence. It is worthwhile not-
ing that the MENA region, while having a much smaller population
and lower population density than other regions, records thehighest se-
verity of political attacks, though it varies from month to month.
Thirdly—and perhaps most importantly—we focus on the MENA
states because they provide an opportunity to test our hypotheses in
the absence of firm-level options to mitigate risks to property rights
through expatriation, through exit. Production in the MENA states is
monopolized by sovereign firms (Table 3) who control a localized mo-
nopoly over production and minimal investment arrangements over-
seas. Unlike multinational energy corporations that can more readily
shift assets away from global “hot spots,” theMENAmonopolies should
exhibit the highest sensitivities to risks of political destabilization due to
their fundamental, vested interest in local resources. Thisfixed nature of
our population ofmonopolies provides confidence our reduced form re-
gression model is free of bias due to observed offshoring of production
in the face of destabilizing local conditions.6
To summarize, we focus our analysis on a critical population of fossil
fuel owners who operate on monopoly terms in a hotbed of both polit-
ical violence and oil production. While we hesitate to argue we may
thus establish robust inferential insights into the behavior of all fossil
fuel owners in all settings, we are confident that key results should
prove transferrable to other contexts marked by significant assets at
risk, severe political violence and spatially-fixed,monopoly ownership.7
Fig. 1 presents a map of the study region and highlights the firms at the
center of our analysis.
Table 1
World proven oil reserves: MENA vs. World.
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015 (%)
Saudi Arabia* 265,850 265,789 266,578 266,455 17.85%
Iran* 157,300 157,800 157,530 158,400 10.61%
Iraq* 140,300 144,211 143,069 142,503 9.55%
Kuwait* 101,500 101,500 101,500 101,500 6.80%
UAE* 97,800 97,800 97,800 97,800 6.55%
Libya* 48,472 48,363 48,363 48,363 3.24%
Qatar* 25,244 25,244 25,244 25,244 1.69%
Algeria* 12,200 12,200 12,200 12,200 0.82%
Oman 5500 4974 5151 5306 0.36%
Egypt 4400 4400 4400 4400 0.29%
Syria 2500 2500 2500 2500 0.17%
Total Region 861,066 864,781 864,335 864,671 57.93%
Examples of leading U.S.-based firms for comparison:
ExxonMobil 10,714 10,113 11,823 12,954 0.87%
Chevron 4353 6455 4285 4262 0.29%
ConocoPhillips 3358 3267 3330 2778 0.19%
Total World 1,478,753 1,489,352 1,490,465 1,492,677 100.00%
Notes: Proven oil reserves inmillion barrels listed for all countries inMiddle East andNorth
Africa (MENA) where monthly oil production data are available, as well as leading U.S.-
based firms and total world proven reserves for comparison. Upper panel data retrieved
from 2016 OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. Lower panel data retrieved from Oil and Gas
Journal. Countries with an asterisk (*) are members of OPEC.
Table 2







Middle East & North Africa 20,712 18,931 54,246
South Asia 19,885 18,740 55,175
South America 17,867 16,638 28,020
Western Europe 14,930 12,977 6218
Central America & Caribbean 10,566 10,138 28,703
Sub-Saharan Africa 7047 6677 33,804
Southeast Asia 6455 6041 11,636
North America 2877 2426 4484
Russia & Newly Independent States 2176 1836 4408
Eastern Europe 1004 927 701
East Asia 700 588 592
Central Asia 236 221 381
Australasia & Oceania 234 206 158
Notes: Total terrorist events, successful attacks, and victim deaths listed for each region in
the world from 1996 to 2014. Data retrieved from Global Terrorism Database, available at
https://www.start.umed.edu/gtd.
Table 3
MENA National Oil Monopolies and Neighboring States.
Country Oil Company Neighboring Oil-Producing States




Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan
Iran National Iranian Oil
Company
Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE,
Afghanistan, Armenia*, Azerbaijan*,
Pakistan*, Turkmenistan




Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
Libya Libya National Oil
Company
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Chad*, Greece*,
Niger*
Qatar Qatar General Petroleum
Corporation





Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar,
Oman, Jordan, UAE, Eritrea*, Yemen
UAE Dubai Petroleum Company
& Abu Dhabi National Oil
Iran, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia
Notes: For each country in our analysis, the oil monopoly and the neighboring oil-produc-
ing states are listed. Countries marked with an asterisk are not included in the count of
neighboring terrorist attacks and kills employed in the primary analysis. An alternative
specification including those nations is available on request. Findings for the two specifi-
cations are not dissimilar and do not alter the reported results. Bahrain, Oman, Syria,
Tunisia, and Turkey not included in our sample due tomissing production data fromOPEC.
6 It should be noted that not all national oil companies are the same. Rather, they exhibit
significant diversity of founding histories (Marcel, 2006), organizational features (Radon
and Logan, 2016), and inter-linkages with the broader national political structures
(Stevens, 2008; Cheon, 2019) and international power dynamics (Sim and Fulton, 2019)
in which they operate.
7 While we have seen some measured convergence in organizational patterns among
international oil monopolies and national oil monopolies in recent years (Cheon, 2019),
we find sustained recognition of distinctive characteristics of national oil companies rela-
tive to international oil companies in the academic and practitioner literature. Notably,
Nakhle (2017) provides a valuable comparative account, with rich background references
on thedistinctive governance, contracting, and licensing behavior of theMENAnational oil
companies in particular, while Claes and Garavini (2020) provide valuable commentary
on the evolution of the OPEC community relative to their international, private market
counterparts.
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3.2. Empirical model
Our hypothesis of violent Hotelling pressures suggests that we
should see oil monopoly countries increasing production after events
of political violence, proportional to the size of the threat. We test this
hypothesis by estimating the impact of in-country political attacks and
kills onmonopolies' oil production in the following period.We estimate
a log-linear model to capture the effect of rising frequency and lethality
of political violence in country c at time t− l on the quantity of oil pro-
duced at time t:
ln qc,t ¼ α þ β1attacksc,t−l þ β2killsc,t−l þ γ1 lnpt−l þ γ2rt−l þ γ4it−l
þγ5t þ γ6t2 þ χc þ εc,t :
ð7Þ
We include control variables for the natural log of the world price
of oil lnpt−l, the S&P 500 index return rt−l, the 3-month Treasury bill
rate it−l, a linear time trend t, a quadratic time trend t2, and country
fixed effects χc.8 Table 4 gives summary statistics for the key variables
and controls. After describing our factors in greater detail below, we
progress to examine several alternative specifications to test for robust-
ness, excluding a variety of these variables and controlling for poten-
tially confounding influences such as civil wars, major insurgencies,
contagion effects, and military spending.
3.3. Outcome variable: Oil production
Weemploy production data fromOPEC to construct our primary de-
pendent variable. We transform reported production volumes to em-
ploy the natural log of annual oil production for our population of
MENA national oil monopolies from 1996 to 2014. Our main specifica-
tions thus utilize a monthly dataset of oil production for these ninemo-
nopolies, giving 2376 firm-month observations.
3.4. Accounting for time to production
We estimate our model with a variety of lag structures. This is done
to ensure the robustness of our results and account for the delays inher-
ent in the translation of managerial decisions to increase oil production
at the firm level and actual changes in realized production. According to
the latest econometric literature, it takes at least six months for oil
production to register the full effects of a supply shock (Kilian, 2009;
Kilian and Murphy, 2012; Baumeister and Hamilton, 2019). Where ex-
ogenous shocks also impact inventory demand, production levels may
take 12 to 15 months to stabilize.9 To engage the ambiguity inherent
in modeling firm-level responses to exogenous shocks when setting
production levels, our primary specifications alternate between the
use of 6- and 12-month lags. We also investigate 9- and 15-month
lags and find comparable effects as those reported below.
3.5. Treatment variables: Events of political violence
We employ data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) devel-
oped and maintained by the University of Maryland College Park. This
datasetmeticulously reports individual events of political violence glob-
ally from 1970 to 2016 (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). The GTD employs
three criteria in identifying political violence for inclusion of events in
the database:
1. The action lies outside the context of legitimatewarfare (LaFree et al.,
2006);
2. The goal of the action is economic, political, religious, or social; and
3. The act was intended to “coerce, intimidate, or convey some other
message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate
victims.”
In using the GTD, we employ the term “political violence” in lieu of
“terrorism,” recognizing the former generally includes the latter.
When we apply more precise definitions of terrorism, such as that of
Keohane (2002), to the GTD, many of the events in which we are most
interested fail to pass the bar of inclusion.10 This definition includes
both domestic actors targeting their own country's institutions, such
as the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries operating in Libya, as
well as international groups operating across borders, such as al-
Qaeda. It excludes violence inflicted by state actors, as the perpetrators
would belong to the same government that oversees the national oil
monopoly, introducing endogeneity between cause and effect. A wider
inclusion of violent attacks against state targets—labeled as non-
terrorist insurgencies and so excluded from the GTD—would in all like-
lihood increase the strength of any estimated responses to political de-
stabilization theorized to constitute violent Hotelling pressures. Our
approach is therefore intentionally conservative.
As Fig. 2 shows, observed severities of political violence have been
increasing over time, but fluctuate significantly from year to year.
Whereas there were fewer than 1000 attacks and 5000 kills annually
Fig. 1. Area of Focus: National Oil Monopolies of Middle East and North Africa.
8 We choose the log-linearmodel because it is a natural form to estimate the impact of a
discrete variable on a continuous variable. The conclusions do not change if we use log-log
or linear-linear, but log-linear is the most intuitive way to estimate and report the results
for these types of variables.We further discuss alternativemodeling approaches inAppen-
dix B.
9 We extend the lag structure to 15 months in Appendix A, and the results hold.
10 Keohane (2002) defines terrorism as “deliberately targeted surprise attacks on arbi-
trarily chosen civilians” in ways designed to instill fear.
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in the MENA region in the 1990s, totals averaged closer to 2000 and
5000, respectively, by the late 2000s. The graph also shows attacks on
government and police—the ultimate protectors of property rights—
have remained a fraction of overall violencewhile following similar pat-
terns over time.
3.6. Economic controls
To isolate the effect of political violence on oil production,we control
for exogenous economic factors that might impact production. We in-
clude four types of controls: theworld price of oil, equity and bondmar-
ket returns, and time trends. Appendix B expands the controls with
additional variables available at an annual frequency, including time-
varying, country-level gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The re-
sults remain robust to the inclusion of these controls.
The treatment effect might also depend on the size of the economy,
asmeasured by GDP, but this variable cannot serve as a control because
it is not a plausibly exogenous economic factor. In these countries, oil
production (the dependent variable) is almost certainly a large driver
of annual GDP for each firm-year observation. In essence, our model is
estimating the effect of political violence on a significant component of
GDP, and therefore it is unwise to control for GDP, which includes this
component. Instead, we estimate the correlation of GDP with attacks
(0.046) and kills (0.043), both of which are very close to zero. This find-
ing reassures us that political violence is not being driven by the size of
the economy – and therefore, this relationship is not contaminating our
estimated results.
3.6.1. World Price of oil
Although each company in our sample is large, none can control the
price by themselves. As a result, the world price of oil is a plausibly ex-
ogenous factor that indicates the current equilibrium between the
world's demand for oil and other companies' supply in the marketplace
inwhich each firm is competing. This average, over the years and across
nations, is readily available for download via Bloomberg.We employ the
geographically appropriate Dubai price in the current estimations.
3.6.2. U.s. equity and bond markets
Oil extracted from the ground and sold generates cash flows that
may be profitably reinvested within financial markets. To highlight
the magnitude of MENA sovereign wealth funds funded by petroleum
revenues, the IMF estimates that in 2008, the AbuDhabi Investment Au-
thority and the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority respectively held be-
tween $250 billion and $875 billion in foreign assets, a sum
comparable to the total holdings of all hedge funds ($1.5 trillion) and
private equity funds ($700billion) in theworld (Drezner, 2008). To con-
trol for the opportunity cost of holding fossil fuels in the ground, we first
control for the annual average returns to the U.S. Standard and Poor
(S&P) 500 index. This measure seeks to capture perceived changes to
the opportunity cost of foregoing investments in the blue-chip U.S. eq-
uities. Second, we control for more low-risk, high-liquidity bond mar-
kets with the coupon rate of U.S. 3-month treasury bills. Together
these two measures serve as strong proxies for the changing market
view of sovereign oil firms' overseas investment opportunities.
3.6.3. Time trends
We include both a linear and quadratic time trend in our models to
account for well-known nonlinearities in time series of oil prices and
production. For example, Kilian (2009), Maslyuk and Smyth (2009),
and Hamilton (2011) show prices and production respond dispropor-
tionately to non-market and geopolitical shocks in non-linear ways. As
a result, simply controlling for prices, output, and interest rates is insuf-
ficient. Inclusion of these amplification factors allow predicted oil pro-




Table 5 presents our fourmain specifications examining all instances
of political violence as drivers of oil production. Predictors are lagged
6 months in the first two columns and 12 months in the latter two. Re-
sults show strong support for H1-A. Rising frequencies of successful at-
tacks (attacks) shows a positive, statistically significant impact on oil
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Monthly Data, 1996–2014.











Total Attacks 11.246 (43.793) 0 / 503 0.053 (0.225) 0 / 1
Attacks v Gov't 0.998 (4.118) 0 / 58 0.004 (0.062) 0 / 1
Attacks v
Police
1.942 (8.338) 0 / 122 0.004 (0.062) 0 / 1
Total Kills 35.68 (155.632) 0 / 3559 0.144 (1.747) 0 / 28
Kills v Gov't 1.722 (8.512) 0 / 165 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0











Total Attacks 3.053 (93.314) 0 / 943 0.250 (1.319) 0 / 12
Attacks v Gov't 8.527 (8.009) 0 / 63 0.061 (0.354) 0 / 3
Attacks v
Police
0.428 (0.805) 0 / 5 0.030 (0.229) 0 / 2
Total Kills 1.417 (1.836) 0 / 12 0.170 (1.052) 0 / 12
Kills v Gov't 1.061 (4.864) 0 / 67 0.030 (0.245) 0 / 3




661.044 (140.366) 491 / 930 955.530
(368.940)
416 / 1660
Total Attacks 7.080 (15.894) 0 / 107 0.019 (0.137) 0 / 1
Attacks v Gov't 0.303 (0.978) 0 / 8 0.004 (0.062) 0 / 1
Attacks v
Police
2.318 (4.960) 0 / 37 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0
Total Kills 9.871 (24.452) 0 / 244 0.011 (0.137) 0 / 2
Kills v Gov't 0.144 (0.642) 0 / 6 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0












Total Attacks 0.640 (0.961) 0 / 4 1.144 (3.475) 0 / 28
Attacks v Gov't 0.098 (0.335) 0 / 2 0.038 (0.191) 0 / 1
Attacks v
Police
0.125 (0.384) 0 / 3 0.049 (0.532) 0 / 8
Total Kills 1.807 (5.262) 0 / 40 2.163 (7.033) 0 / 47
Kills v Gov't 0.170 (1.424) 0 / 22 0.322 (0.990) 0 / 7






53 / 4685 2517.712
(282.733)
250 / 3226
Total Attacks 83.477 (104.930) 0 / 503 0.027 (0.183) 0 / 2
Attacks v Gov't 8.045 (9.746) 0 / 58 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0
Attacks v
Police
13.258 (21.183) 0 / 122 0.004 (0.062) 0 / 1
Total Kills 267.909 (383.611) 0 / 3559 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0
Kills v Gov't 14.045 (21.340) 0 / 165 0.004 (0.062) 0 / 1
Kills v Police 39.398 (77.174) 0 / 922 0.000 (0.000) 0 / 0
Notes: For each country in our analysis aswell as the entire group, this table lists themean,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of monthly oil production (in million bar-
rels), total terrorist attacks and kills, attacks and kills on government institutions, and at-
tacks and kills on police. There are 264 observations for each individual state monopoly,
for a total of 2376 month-firm observations overall.
11 We also run tests where we square the other variables, such as attacks, kills, and oil
price, and the results are robust to the inclusion of all these squared variables. Estimates
available from authors upon request.
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Fig. 2. Frequency and Lethality of Political Violence in MENA Region.
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production in all specifications. Moreover, the magnitude is consistent
across specifications, with an additional attack leading to a 0.24–0.27%
increase in production. These specifications, however, show no support
for H1–B. Rising lethality of political violence (kills) is insignificant as a
driver of production, both as a standalone variable in columns (1) and
(3), aswell as in the specifications (2) and (4) that account for the influ-
ence of the interactions of frequency and lethality in shaping marginal
effects.
Table 6 presents a second set of regressions structured to test H2 and
H3, examining the impact of political violence that targets the institu-
tions of the state. Here, terrorist violence andmarket controls are lagged
6months. Columns (1) and (2) show strong support for H2-A andH2–B.
Estimated coefficients of increases in both the frequency and lethality of
terrorist violence targeting police are significant and positive. When
controlling for the interaction (Attacks × Kills) in Column (2), main ef-
fects remain significant and positive and increase in magnitude.
For political violence targeting the government, the base specifica-
tion in Column (3) shows support for H3-A but not for H3–B. The anal-
ysis estimates a positive, significant impact on oil production for
increased frequencies of attacks that is approximately three times the
magnitude as that estimated for increased frequencies of attacks on po-
lice (0.0186 vs. 0.0068). Increasing lethality of political violence is insig-
nificant.When controlling for the interaction (Attacks× Kills) in Column
(4), the panel regression shows both main effects to be significant and
positive.
These results are robust to changes in the setting of lags. Appendix A
shows that the coefficients reported in Table 5 are nearly identical with
9- and 15-month lags, whereby events of political violence exhibit a
positive, statistically significant impact on production. An additional at-
tack is associated with a 0.24–0.27% increase in production. As seen in
Table 5, when looking at all forms of violence, the lethality of violence
(Kills) is insignificant, and the inclusion of an interaction variable does
not alter the results.
Results examining violence against the government and police are
similarly robust. Appendix A shows that Attacks versus the government
and police are significant drivers of production at a 12-month lag, and
again, accounting for the interaction of Attacks × Kills renders the coef-
ficient on Kills significant and positive.
Across models, our controls appear reasonable and suggestive of ra-
tional economic behavior. At a lag of 12 months, the S&P 500 is signifi-
cant and positive, suggesting that oil companies set out to increase
extraction when equities markets are improving. This is consistent
with economic theory in two ways: (1) It suggests that producers are
responding to aggregate demand in the form of an expanding global
economy, and (2) Hotelling's rule predicts that oil companies will ex-
tract and sell more oil to invest the proceeds in a rising stock market.
Bond market returns are similarly positive but insignificant, which is
unsurprising since stock prices should internalize the risk-free rate
into their valuation. Finally, the oil price is statistically insignificant, con-
sistentwith the latest economic theory and empirical evidence showing
that oil producers do not respond to prices in the short run (Anderson
et al., 2016).
4.2. Robustness tests
Our main findings indicate that increasing political violence drives
sovereign oil monopolies to increase near-term production. These re-
sults lend credence to the theory of risk-induced extraction and confirm
our hypothesis of violent Hotelling pressures. A series of robustness
checks further serve to increase our confidence in these findings.
4.2.1. Exogeneity of political violence
An important strength of our model lies in the arguably exogenous
nature of political violence, which theoretically should lie outside the
“black box” of rational firm behavior. Indeed, the architects of political
violence generally aim to drive institutional change by attacking people,
as opposed to strategic resources; this is one of the factors that differen-
tiate them from traditional wartime combatants (Pape, 2005). To put
this idea to the test, we re-run the model with additional controls for
traditional wartime activity. An ongoing war would more clearly
threaten company assets and so, if unobserved, could inflate the esti-
mated effect of observed political violence on firm action. Table 7 dis-
plays five such tests with 6-month lags. The first model runs the main
specification with a dummy variable for all country-months in which
one of our sample states faced an ethnic or revolutionary war. The re-
maining fourmodels control forwars in a single country. Data informing
the selection of dummy variables for civil wars and insurgencies ob-
served in four OPEC states—Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Libya—are drawn
from the Political Instability Task Force organized by the Center for Sys-
temic Peace.12 The primary pattern of results holds in all five
specifications.
Table 5
Main Effects: Frequency and Lethality of Terrorist Violence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6-mo lag 6-mo lag 12-mo lag 12-mo lag
Attacks 0.0025** 0.0027** 0.0024** 0.0025**
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Kills 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0130 −0.0141 −0.0042 −0.0046
(0.0592) (0.0614) (0.0583) (0.0593)
S&P 500 −0.1672 −0.1715 0.1907** 0.1876**
(0.1549) (0.1639) (0.0815) (0.0754)
T-bill 12.3471 11.8005 5.5124 5.0350
(11.6016) (10.3837) (11.7369) (10.5071)
Attacks×Kills −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 2322 2322 2268 2268
R2 0.1235 0.1242 0.1069 0.1073
Notes:Dependent variable is thenatural log ofmonthly oil production. Regression includes
country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 6
Varieties of Violence: Police and Government.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Police Police Government Government
Attacks 0.0068** 0.0098** 0.0186*** 0.0250***
(0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0067)
Kills 0.0008** 0.0031*** 0.0006 0.0047**
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0016)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0255 −0.0230 −0.0328 −0.0341
(0.0721) (0.0701) (0.0770) (0.0780)
S&P 500 −0.1712 −0.1728 −0.1668 −0.1750
(0.1660) (0.1753) (0.1534) (0.1579)
T-bill 14.1314 12.0992 17.9948 17.4006
(13.1500) (11.2736) (16.1898) (15.9175)
Attacks×Kills −0.0000** −0.0003**
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Observations 2322 2322 2322 2322
R2 0.0842 0.0942 0.0850 0.0908
Notes:Dependent variable is the natural log ofmonthly oil production. In Columns 1 and2,
only Attacks and Kills on government entities are included. In Columns 3 and 4, only At-
tacks andKills on thepolice are included. Regression includes countryfixed effects and lin-
ear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in
parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
12 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html for the CSP's datasets on
armed conflict and intervention.
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4.2.2. Reverse causation
Ourmodel assumes that the quantity of oil production does not have
a reverse causal effect on political violence. A growing literature on the
“resource curse” has questioned whether terrorists intentionally target
oil resources, beginning with Gelb (1988) and Autry (1993) and build-
ing on the empirical work of Sachs and Warner (1995). Many studies
have found that oil abundance makes it more likely that a country will
experience violent conflict, but it is a weak relationship—by some
counts, affecting less than half of oil-producing states (Ross, 2003,
2004). Some recent work confirms this relationship. Koos and
Pierskalla (2016) show that in Nigeria local government areas with
more oil production tend to experience more violence.13 Of course,
this correlation could just result from reverse causality due to violent
Hotelling pressures.
Other recent studies cast additional doubt on the claim that oil pro-
duction leads to political violence. Basedau and Lay (2009) point out
that it is equally possible for oil to have the opposite effect. According
to “rentier state theory,” oil-rich governments might buy off opposition
groups, making them less violent than other unstable countries. Consis-
tent with this hypothesis, they find that oil per capita and violent con-
flict exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship, with the most oil-rich
countries “almost completely spared from violent conflict.” These coun-
tries form the majority of our sample in this paper. Dreher and
Kreibaum (2016) add nuance to this finding by studying the motiva-
tions of ethno-political groups and showing that oil makes them more
likely to rebel and trigger a civil war in an effort to extract oil rents,
but not to become terrorists or engage in wholesale political violence.14
When the focus shifts fromoil production to oil reserves, the evidence
for the resource curse is stronger. Caselli et al. (2015) and Morelli and
Rohner (2015) show that a high concentration of oil reserves increases
the likelihood of interstate conflicts and civil wars, respectively, espe-
cially when the resource ownership is concentrated among a particular
ethnic group. Both analyses are interested in S, the remaining resource
stock, while our hypotheses focus on q, the rate of extraction. This is a
crucial distinction. There is no evidence in these studies that increased
production attracts violence—and especially political violence, which is
not their preferred outcome variable.
We therefore test this resource curse hypothesis in the context of
our theoretical model by estimating the effect of the lagged log of pro-
duction on terrorist violence. The results of this exercise support our
presumption that oil production does not have a significant effect on at-
tacks, confirming our intuition that terrorism ismuchmore likely to im-
pact production than vice versa. This result holds when production is
lagged 6, 9, 12, and 15months, and it continues to hold with or without
the inclusion of the controls used in our main model above.15
Similarly, we consider the possibility that oil production is associ-
atedwith higher unemployment, either because it depletes the reserves
that form the basis of expectations for future economic growth or be-
cause the government tries to increase oil revenues when the economy
needs to be stimulated. This higher unemployment, in turn, might mo-
tivate people to rebel and join violent political groups. Using the annual
data in Appendix B, we test the effect of oil production on both the un-
employment rate and the year-to-year change in unemployment, and
we find that it is consistently insignificant and has the wrong sign for
such a hypothesis. The other variables generally have little explanatory
power as well, suggesting that unemployment is not a central factor in
this analysis.
4.2.3. Exogeneity of the price of oil
A third concernmight involve the assumed exogeneity of themarket
controls, particularly the oil price. Eight of the eleven countries in our
sample are members of OPEC, which is frequently described as a cartel
with price-setting power. Most evidence, however, does not support
this characterization in the modern period. For example, Alhajji and
Huettner (2000) review 13 statistical studies that seek to detect
whether OPEC acts like a cartel, wherein 11 reject the cartel hypothesis.
Hochman and Zilberman (2015) explain these findings by showing that
OPEC is not only motivated by extracting profit from its foreign cus-
tomers; itsmembers also have to please their domestic consumers, frus-
trating their ability to act as one cartel. Hamilton (2009) further
supports this conclusion, showing that OPEC members' production
levels persistently deviate from the so-called “quotas” OPEC purports
to enforce. This is unsurprising, as OPEC deploys no “clear monitoring
or enforcement mechanism.” Hamilton concludes, “Although there
was once a time in which a few oil companies played a big role in
world oil markets, that era is long past.”
Despite a lack of evidence, we take the price-setting concern seri-
ously and test the robustness of ourmodel in each of themain four spec-
ifications with the world oil price excluded from the regression. The
tests, reported in Table 8, show that terrorist attacks continue to be pos-
itive and statistically significant, confirming that our findings are not
solely dependent on an exogenous oil price control variable.
4.2.4. Cross-border contamination
We anticipate that the impacts of violent Hotelling pressures may
cross national borders. Our concern follows from long-recognized his-
torical trends of “contagion” of warfare, revolutions, crime, and other
forms of instability from one county to another (Keohane, 2002; Black,
2013; National Academy of Sciences, 2013). Given the prevalence of
cross-border political violence in the region over the last two decades,
as seen markedly in Syria, Turkey, and Iran, we wish to assess whether
unobserved “contagion” effects may be driving the results. To investi-
gate cross-border influences, we produce a matrix of adjacent countries
for each of theMENA states (Table 3). This allows us to construct amea-
sure for each country-month in our panel for the total number of attacks
and the total number of victim deaths for all oil-producing neighboring
states.
Table 7
Robustness Test: Ethnic & Revolutionary War Controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Algeria Egypt Iraq Libya
Attacks 0.0025*** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0026**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Kills 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0153 −0.0224 −0.0162 −0.0133 −0.0959
(0.0637) (0.0420) (0.0649) (0.0347) (0.0757)
S&P 500 −0.1684 −0.1751 −0.1932 −0.1677 −0.2045
(0.1581) (0.1531) (0.1732) (0.1312) (0.1668)
T-bill 12.6232 10.8767 13.4410 12.3901 24.1010
(12.5722) (13.7326) (12.3833) (9.5071) (15.3048)
Observations 2322 2322 2322 2322 2322
R2 0.1237 0.1239 0.1244 0.1235 0.1565
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of monthly oil production. In Column 2, a
dummy variable is used to control for firm-years in which Algeria is experiencing a war.
In Column 3, a dummy variable is used to control for firm-years in which Egypt is
experiencing a war. In Column 4, a dummy variable is used to control for firm-years in
which Iraq is experiencing a war. In Column 5, a dummy variable is used to control for
firm-years in which Libya is experiencing a war. In Column 1, a dummy variable is used
to control for all war experiences in the other specifications combined. Standard errors
are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
13 Koos and Pierskalla argue anecdotally that Nigerian elites expropriated oil rents, an-
gered the local population, and then suppressed peaceful protests, leading to violent
conflict.
14 Consistent with research by Pape (2005), this distinction may lie in variable levels of
“greed” and “grievance.” 15 These regression results are all available from the authors upon request.
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We test whether cross-border impacts confound our original results
by running specifications that include terrorism attacks and kills from
neighboring oil-producing states. Table 9 reports the resulting coeffi-
cients, which show no contagion effects, and our original treatment ef-
fects remain robust to their inclusion.
4.2.5. Alternative causal mechanism
Our validation of the theory of risk-induced extraction hinges on the
mechanism by which political violence spurs production. In the face of
rising political violence, states may have an incentive to sell oil and
use the proceeds to increase military spending. This alternative causal
mechanism, if valid, would contradict our theoretical priors. We can
test this alternate mechanism using the military expenditure database
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.16 Table 10
shows fourmodels that attempt to predictmilitary spendingwith polit-
ical violence. In the first two models (with and without an interaction
term), the dependent variable is the natural log of annual military
spending. In the lattermodels, the dependent variable ismilitary spend-
ing as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In all
four cases, both attacks and kills are insignificant at the 5% level. Political
violence does not appear to predict spending.
As a further robustness test, Table 11 replicates our main specifica-
tion with the inclusion of military spending as a control. All attacks
and government attacks remain significant and positive, consistent
with our main findings. The coefficient on police attacks remains posi-
tive but not significant, but police kills are positive and significant at
the 1% level. Moreover, military spending remains an insignificant pre-
dictor of production. These tests confirm that military spending is not a
confounding factor—and therefore, not themechanism by which politi-
cal violence spurs production.
4.2.6. Multicollinearity of treatment variables
The twomeasures of political violence—frequency and lethality—are
clearly related. In fact, attacks (frequency) are a prerequisite for kills (le-
thality), and so it is not surprising that they have a high correlation
(0.829). It is therefore reasonable to wonder whether our results are
partly driven by multicollinearity in our preferred model, which in-
cludes them both simultaneously. While we believe it is important
(andmore conservative) to show that each is significant even after con-
trolling for the other, we run robustness tests separating them into their
own models in Table 12. Not only are our results robust to this separa-
tion, but they actually become stronger, both inmagnitude and in statis-
tical significance.
4.2.7. Alternative measure of political risk
Political violence is only one type of risk, and observed violencemay
not be a perfect measure of anticipated risk. For these reasons, we con-
sider an alternativemeasure of political risk. It is not our preferredmea-
sure because (a) its construction is less transparent and (b) its meaning
is more difficult to interpret; however, it serves as a useful check on the
validity using violence as a measure of this type of risk.
In this robustness test, we use the political risk index from the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled monthly by the PRS
Group.17 Each country is scored on 12 variables that add up to a
Table 8
Robustness Test: Sensitivity to Oil Price.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6-mo lag 6-mo lag 12-mo lag 12-mo lag
Attacks 0.0025** 0.0027** 0.0024** 0.0025**
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Kills 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
S&P 500 −0.1705 −0.1750 0.1902** 0.1871**
(0.1647) (0.1742) (0.0766) (0.0707)
T-bill 11.4327 10.8281 5.1697 4.6606
(9.0621) (8.0525) (9.1333) (8.1154)
Attacks×Kills −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 2322 2322 2268 2268
R2 0.1234 0.1240 0.1068 0.1073
Notes: Regression replicates main effects (Table 5) with the exclusion of the oil price. De-
pendent variable is the natural log ofmonthly oil production. Regression includes country
fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 9
Robustness test: contagion effects.
(1) (2) (3)
All Police Government
Attacks 0.0028** 0.0102** 0.0259***
(0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0076)
Kills 0.0001 0.0031*** 0.0048**
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0018)
Attacks×Kills −0.0000 −0.0000** −0.0003**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Adjacent Attacks 0.0007 0.0023 0.0066
(0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0073)
Adjacent Kills 0.0003 0.0010 0.0027
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0015)
Adjacent Attacks×Kills −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0066 −0.0257 −0.0501
(0.0613) (0.0691) (0.0766)
S&P 500 −0.1923 −0.1904 −0.1902
(0.1593) (0.1724) (0.1641)
T-bill 3.7637 8.2980 18.2094
(11.9438) (12.4318) (15.8033)
Observations 2322 2322 2322
R2 0.1474 0.1034 0.1021
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of monthly oil production. Independent
variables are lagged 6 months. Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and
quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 10
Robustness test: military spending predictions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Spending) ln(Spending) Spend/GDP Spend/GDP
Attacks 0.0008 −0.0014 0.0001* 0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Kills −0.0002 −0.0012 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Oil Price) 0.1715 0.1620 −0.0096* −0.0097*
(0.1109) (0.1135) (0.0048) (0.0048)
S&P 500 0.1891** 0.2161** 0.0066 0.0070
(0.0698) (0.0784) (0.0048) (0.0049)
T-bill −8.3875 −1.5234 1.2373 1.3228
(16.2530) (14.9587) (1.0484) (1.0241)
Attacks×Kills 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 1806 1806 1824 1824
R2 0.1556 0.1720 0.3355 0.3386
Notes: In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the natural log of annual military
spending. In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is annualmilitary spending as a per-
centage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Independent variables are lagged
6months. Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p< 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
16 See sipri.org/databases/milex.
17 These data are not publicly available. They require subscriber access, but theirwebsite
explains the ICRG at https://www.prsgroup.com/explore-our-products/
international-country-risk-guide/.
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maximum of 100 points reflecting expert assessments of government
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict,
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law
and order, ethnic tensions, bureaucratic accountability, and bureaucracy
quality.
Following the same methodology as we did in our main model,
Table 13 shows that the political risk variables yield the same results
as our violence variables: Increased risk leads to more oil production
at 6-, 9-, 12-, and 15-month lags—and the results are statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level.
4.2.8. Structural breaks
Finally, we consider the possibility that the nature of oil production
changed along with the business cycle. Perhaps fiscal regimes change
with respect to oil investment during recessions, or perhaps the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 launched a new era of austerity and restricted access
to credit. We control for these potential structural breaks in the model
by adding dummy variables that indicate (a) when recessions occur,
(b) when the global housing bubble has ended, and (c) when the
Great Recession has ended.18 Table 14 shows the 6-month and 12-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Robustness test: separating frequency and lethality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





ln(Oil Price) −0.0140 −0.0063 −0.0051 0.0004
(0.0603) (0.0520) (0.0593) (0.0532)
S&P 500 −0.1646 −0.1776 0.1940** 0.1803**
(0.1536) (0.1628) (0.0837) (0.0770)
T-bill 12.9872 9.5975 6.2224 3.2880
(11.9634) (8.5192) (12.3344) (8.7384)
Observations 2322 2322 2268 2268
R2 0.1231 0.0937 0.1063 0.0781
Notes:Dependent variable is thenatural log ofmonthly oil production. Regression includes
country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 13
Robustness test: ICRG political risk ratings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6-mo lag 9-mo lag 12-mo lag 15-mo lag
Political Risk 0.0303*** 0.0263*** 0.0242*** 0.0236***
(0.0075) (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0048)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0137 −0.0135 −0.0144 −0.0211
(0.0823) (0.0751) (0.0732) (0.0591)
S&P 500 −0.2113 0.0449 0.2317* 0.1522*
(0.2045) (0.1715) (0.1190) (0.0782)
T-bill 13.3111 10.7969 9.8311 8.8037
(25.2280) (23.0745) (23.9454) (23.2428)
Observations 1806 1785 1764 1743
R2 0.1517 0.1182 0.1026 0.0959
Notes: Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times
trends. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
18 For recession months, we rely on the official National Bureau of Economic Research
business cycle dates at https://www.nber.org/cycles.html; while these dates are
assigned based on United States data, they are still a useful indicator of when the global
economy was weak, especially considering how strongly U.S. recessions are related to
oil prices econometrically Hamilton (2011). For the post-bubble indicator, we choose Sep-
tember 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, as the beginning of the crisis
and the end of the bubble.
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are all robust to their inclusion. Moreover, the new coefficients are sta-
tistically insignificant, indicating that these potential breaks in the time
series are not structurally important. These results accord with our ear-
lier findings that oil production is not significantly related to unemploy-
ment, which tends to fluctuate with the business cycle.
Because oil is largely produced for exporting, we can test more ex-
plicitly for changes in the fiscal regime by controlling for trade. In
Table B.5, exports have a strongly significant effect on oil production,
but imports do not. In all of these specifications, however, the model
continues to deliver the positive, significant results for the effects of po-
litical violence on oil production, supporting the robustness of our main
estimates to different fiscal regimes.
5. Conclusion
Conventionalwisdomseems to hold that uncertainty reduces invest-
ment. Indeed, some markets give evidence to this effect (Bloom, 2009;
Christiano et al., 2014). In dealing with exhaustible natural resources,
however, Sinn (2008) argues that the relationshipmight flow in the op-
posite direction.When facedwith the threat of losing their property, re-
source owners may have an incentive to extract even faster to “beat the
clock” that tickswithstaccatobursts of violence.Until now, the literature
has only tested the theory of risk-induced extraction in the context of
policy-induced expropriation, particularly in the industrialized world
where carbon policy is more common. This extraction also depends on
the security of the oil well itself, however, particularly in the oil-rich
states of the MENA region. It is here, at the wellhead, that we focus our
investigation andfind that expropriation threatsmanifest not frompub-
lic policy, but rather from the threat of violence and state destabilization.
We refer to these threats as “violent Hotelling pressures.”
In this paper, we test a variant of the theory of risk-induced extrac-
tion in the context of state oil monopolies and estimate the impact of
political violence on production.We find strong support for our hypoth-
esis that oil producers increase extraction in response to increasingly se-
vere political violence and violence that particularly threatens those
institutions tasked with securing property rights. Our findings validate
the theory of risk-induced extraction and provide a more nuanced un-
derstanding of where and when it plays out.
These findings are important, both for understandingmarket behav-
ior and for global environmental governance. Increased extraction due
to violent Hotelling pressures exacerbates the problem of climate
change and therefore deserves greater attention by researchers to un-
derstand its magnitude, mechanisms, and potential policy responses.
In recent years, security studies have increasingly incorporated climate
science to improve near- and medium-term planning. Our findings
should motivate climate policy to incorporate security studies, as
policymakers might otherwise underestimate the threat of state desta-
bilization to undermine efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions.
Conversely, this work highlights the benefits of a more secure system
of property rights for global climate stability.
Many robustness tests corroborate these results, but as always, the
analysis has important limitations. First, it does not identify the poten-
tial heterogeneity of treatment effects across different political regimes
or security policies. Factors such as internal governance or external alli-
ances, for example, might moderate or exacerbate the effect of political
violence on oil production. Second, the findings may not generalize to
multinational corporations with diverse investment opportunities. Un-
like the sovereign monopolies in the MENA region, other large oil
firmsmay have more flexibility to shift capital to alternative industries;
therefore, their response to political violence may be weaker. Finally,
past behavior may not always be predictive of future behavior. Many
MENA countries are currently in the process of diversifying their econ-
omies and investment strategies away from dependence on fossil
fuels. If they are successful, the effect of political violence on oil produc-
tion may evolve along with the new corporate priorities as they reflect
the changing opportunity cost.
Despite these considerations, this analysis does make clear that po-
litical violence has been increasing oil production by national oil mo-
nopolies over the last several decades, and the work demonstrates a
previously underappreciated benefit of secure property rights. The
path of resource extraction is accelerated when those rights are threat-
ened to the clear detriment of the climate. This core finding has impor-
tant policy implications. It underscores the importance of incorporating
climate concerns in national security policymaking and incorporating
political violence in the modeling of the future paths of greenhouse
gas emissions. Fundamentally, global policymakers should place in-
creased emphasis on the security of property rights to prevent the sub-
optimal acceleration of exhaustible resource extraction.
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Table 14
Robustness test: structural breaks.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6-mo lag 6-mo lag 6-mo lag 12-mo lag 12-mo lag 12-mo lag
Attacks 0.0025*** 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0024**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Kills 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0132 −0.0196 −0.0163 −0.0058 −0.0038 −0.0043
(0.0602) (0.0816) (0.0684) (0.0585) (0.0639) (0.0671)
S&P 500 −0.1649 −0.1788 −0.1825 0.1937** 0.1931** 0.1908*
(0.1343) (0.1776) (0.1893) (0.0806) (0.0615) (0.0866)
T-bill 12.2195 14.4860 14.7830 3.7054 5.2458 5.5910







Observations 2322 2322 2322 2268 2268 2268
R2 0.1235 0.1238 0.1238 0.1070 0.1069 0.1069
Notes: Regression includes countryfixed effects and linear andquadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered byfirmand reported in parentheses: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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and the 2017 Commodity and EnergyMarkets Conference. All errors are
the authors' alone.
Notes: The national oil monopolies of Middle East and North Africa
are denoted in color. Other countries are denoted in gray. Water is de-
noted in white. Not all of these monopolies are used in our analysis
due to lack of data. See Table 1 for list of national monopolies reporting
OPEC reproduction data.
Notes: These graphs show the total attacks and kills resulting from
political violence in our dataset for the Middle East and North Africa,
with specific subcategories denoted for attacks on government and po-
lice targets. Data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
developed and maintained by the University of Maryland College Park.
Appendix A. Empirical results for alternative lag structures
Our main specifications use 6- and 12-month lags for our explanatory and economic control variables. As a robustness test, we repeat our primary
regression (Table 5) using 9- and 15-month lags in Table A.1. Results are highly consistent, with Attacks showing a consistent, significant, and positive
impact on production. Next, we replicate our work on violence against the police and government using a 9-month lag in Table A.2. Here again, we
find strong evidence of risk-induced extraction, as increasing frequencies and intensities of terrorism drive up production.We also find a similar pat-
tern of decreasingmarginal interactive impacts (negative slope in the interaction term) in Column (4) regarding violence targeting the government,
though at a reduced (−0.0002) slope, meaning that even higher thresholds of violence would need to be met for marginal increases in terrorism to
exhibit a reverse impact and reduce production. Taken together, variations in the lag structures increase our confidence in themain results and their
support for hypotheses H1.a, H2.a, H2.b, and H3.a.
Appendix B. Empirical results for annual data
Our theory of risk-induced extraction suggests thatwe should see oilmonopoly countries increasingproduction after terrorist events, proportional to
the size of the threat. Ourmain specifications test this theory by estimating the effect ofmonthly terrorist violence in a country on their oil production
in the followingmonths. As a robustness test,we replicate the investigation using aggregate, annualmeasures for terrorist violence as a hypothesized
driver of increased future oil production.We again estimate a log-linearmodel, seeking to estimate the effect of the level of attacks and kills in coun-
try c at time t − 1 on the change in the quantity of oil produced at time t:
ln qc,t ¼ α þ β1attacksc,t−1 þ β2killsc,t−1 þ γ1pt−1 þ γ2gc,t−1 þ γ3rt−1
þγ4it−1 þ γ5Δwc,t−1 þ γ5t þ γ6t2 þ χc þ εc,t :
ðB:1Þ
Themain variables are defined in the same way as in themain specifications. Additionally, an annual frequency allows us to include two factors un-
available at a monthly frequency: the annual growth rate of gross domestic product gc, t−1 and the annual percent change in world oil consumption
Δwc, t−1. Table B.1 lists the annual variables, sources, and descriptive statistics.19
19 Some previous studies have used structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) to model prices and quantities with multiple lags. SVARs are very sensitive to the modeler's assumptions,
however, because they require the econometrician to explicitly rule out outcomes that violate theoretical priors.Moreover, they tend to be set-identified, requiring themodeler to specify a
method bywhich themost appropriate impulse response is selected from the set ofmodels thatfit the data. For all these reasons, SVARs are costly procedures that introduce significant risk
of modeling bias. To avoid this risk, we instead (a) report many different lag structures to ensure the robustness of the results and (b) conduct robustness tests in Section 4.2.2 to ensure
that our results are not driven by this type of reverse causality.
Table A.2
Varieties of violence: police and government.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Police Police Government Government
Attacks 0.0072** 0.0096** 0.0188*** 0.0223***
(0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0062)
Kills 0.0007** 0.0029*** −0.0002 0.0021*
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0147 −0.0147 −0.0219 −0.0229
(0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0729) (0.0741)
S&P 500 0.1869** 0.1814** 0.1902** 0.1859**
(0.0747) (0.0642) (0.0817) (0.0797)
T-bill 6.9887 5.3524 10.9396 10.6435
(13.1302) (11.4940) (16.4832) (16.3381)
Attacks × Kills −0.0000** −0.0002*
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Observations 2268 2268 2268 2268
R2 0.0782 0.0856 0.0746 0.0764
Notes: Thedependent variable is the natural log of annual oil production. Independent var-
iables are lagged 9 months. Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and qua-
dratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses: *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.1
Main effects: frequency and lethality of terrorist violence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9-mo lag 9-mo lag 15-mo lag 15-mo lag
Attacks 0.0024** 0.0026** 0.0024** 0.0025**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Kills 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0095 −0.0103 −0.0034 −0.0038
(0.0565) (0.0582) (0.0483) (0.0494)
S&P 500 0.0343 0.0300 0.1269** 0.1247*
(0.1195) (0.1167) (0.0543) (0.0569)
T-bill 8.4563 7.8789 2.4937 2.1247
(10.7240) (9.4692) (11.4124) (10.3563)
Attacks×Kills −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 2295 2295 2241 2241
R2 0.1138 0.1145 0.1004 0.1007
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of annual oil production. Regression in-
cludes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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We include the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) to control for exogenous macroeconomic factors that may be affecting oil pro-
duction in each country. Each state oil monopolymay respond to themacroeconomic shocks impacting the business environment in each year. These
shocks often arise from outside the oil industry, but they may impact all industries' ability to produce and sell their products. We draw GDP figures
from the International Monetary Fund and calculate year-over-year percent changes to capture changes in perceived trends as opposed to basic
levels.
We include the annual percent change inworld oil consumption to capture perceptible changes in trends of global demand for oil. From1996 to 2014,
OECD demand fell from approximately 48million to 46million barrels per day (bpd), while Chinese consumption quadrupled from approximately 3
to 12million bpd. U.S. oil consumption peaked at approximately 20.7 million bpd from 2004 through 2007, fell with the recession in 2008 and 2009,
and has since leveled out around 19 million barrels per day (Energy Information Administration, 2014). Analysts anticipate global oil demand will
peak between 2020 and 2040 due to alternative fuel competition, efficiency gains, and environmental policies, posing significant challenges for coun-
tries such as the OPEC states who derive very large portions of their GDP from oil exports (van de Graaf and Verbruggen, 2015).
Table B.2 shows the results for five variations of our annual regressionmodel: (1) excluding kills and the interaction of Attacks andKills, (2) excluding
GDP growth and the interaction, (3) excluding GDP growth, (4) excluding the interaction, and (5) the full model. In all cases, higher intensities of
terrorist violence are positive and significant. In the first two specifications, an additional terrorist attack leads to an increase in annual oil production
by 0.01–0.03%. In the latter four specifications, an additional terrorism kill leads to an increase in annual oil production by 0.01–0.02%. The Attacks
variable is not always statistically significant, which is not surprising given the low number of observations at an annual frequency, but it remains
positive and exhibits a consistent magnitude across specifications. Where included, increasing intensities (Kills) are always significant and positive
in their estimated influence on oil production.
We also use the annual data to determine whether oil production has any effect on unemployment. Table B.3 shows the effect of all the lagged var-
iables (in various combinations) on the unemployment rate, and Table B.4 shows their effect on annual changes in the unemployment rate. The oil
production variable is consistently insignificant, as aremost of the variables. Higher oil prices and stockmarket growth are associatedwith a decrease
in the unemployment rate at the 10% level of significance, capturing the expected effects of economic growth.
Finally, we use the annual data to test for any confounding effects of trade, possibly due to changing fiscal regimes that affect how oil is exported.
Table B.5 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of these trade variables.
Table B.1
Annual variable sources and descriptive statistics, 1996–2014.
Variable Data Source N Mean SD Min Max
National GDP Growth World Bank 19 54.21 35.2 12.2 109.1
Oil Price (Dubai) Bloomberg 19 56.65 35.8 12.7 111.7
World Oil Consumption EIA.gov 19 82,663 6271 71,812 92,086
S&P 500 (U.S.) Bloomberg 19 10.26 18.95 −36.55 33.10
U.S. 3-Month Treasury Bill Bloomberg 19 3.29 2.18 0.56 6.86
Terrorist Attacks GTD 241 87 370 0 3925
Oil-Neighbors Adjacent Attacks GTD 241 421 824 2 4697
Terrorist Kills GTD 241 261 1180 0 13,075
Oil-Neighbors Adjacent Kills GTD 241 1301 2634 1 16,765
Table B.2
Robustness test: annual frequency.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attacks 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Kills 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Oil Price) 0.0538 0.0640 0.0668 0.0405 0.0412
(0.1477) (0.1161) (0.1256) (0.1570) (0.1675)
GDP Growth −0.0755 −0.0850 −0.0843
(0.2775) (0.2769) (0.2658)
S&P 500 0.0009 0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008)
T-bill 0.0000 −0.0015 −0.0012 0.0043 0.0043
(0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0158) (0.0150)
Global Consumption −0.0076 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0048 −0.0047
(0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0164)
Attacks × Kills 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 210 253 253 210 210
R2 0.2888 0.3149 0.3152 0.2979 0.2979
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of annual oil production. Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standard errors are clustered by
firm and reported in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3
Robustness test: effects on unemployment rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Oil Price) −1.2401 −1.1360 −1.3008 −1.7426 −1.5745 −1.8739
(1.6190) (1.5754) (1.7272) (1.9391) (1.8805) (2.1237)
GDP Growth −0.3854 −0.3332 −0.4644 −0.5262 −0.5322 −0.8026
(0.7732) (0.7087) (0.8791) (0.8192) (0.8292) (1.1916)
S&P 500 −0.0144 −0.0134 −0.0136 −0.0160 −0.0153 −0.0162
(0.0102) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0129)
T-bill 0.0037 −0.0350 −0.0389 0.0796 0.0271 0.0040
(0.1778) (0.1606) (0.1554) (0.2074) (0.1928) (0.1822)
Global Consumption −0.0015 −0.0305 −0.0384 0.0350 0.0032 −0.0173
(0.0648) (0.0632) (0.0562) (0.0638) (0.0632) (0.0593)
Attacks 0.0032 0.0061 0.0043 0.0103
(0.0037) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0101)
Kills −0.0018 −0.0014 −0.0020 −0.0016
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0020)
Attacks × Kills −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Oil Production) −0.3827 −0.8216 −0.9532
(0.7611) (0.7890) (0.7970)
Observations 264 254 254 218 210 210
R2 0.0516 0.0652 0.0775 0.0825 0.1096 0.1452
Notes: Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standarderrors are clustered byfirmand reported inparentheses: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table B.4
Robustness test: effects on change in unemployment rate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Oil Price) −0.6639* −0.6390* −0.6614* −0.6980 −0.6600 −0.7075
(0.3416) (0.3460) (0.3560) (0.4009) (0.3952) (0.4240)
GDP Growth −0.1198 −0.1556 −0.1734 −0.2076 −0.2351 −0.2780
(0.2903) (0.2924) (0.2961) (0.3238) (0.2966) (0.3206)
S&P 500 −0.0097* −0.0094* −0.0095* −0.0078 −0.0076 −0.0077
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046)
T-bill 0.0682 0.0594 0.0589 0.0484 0.0371 0.0334
(0.0645) (0.0674) (0.0680) (0.0710) (0.0724) (0.0711)
Global Consumption −0.0337 −0.0414 −0.0425 −0.0307 −0.0374 −0.0407
(0.0362) (0.0452) (0.0448) (0.0437) (0.0545) (0.0547)
Attacks 0.0006 0.0010 0.0008 0.0018
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Kills −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Attacks × Kills −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(Oil Production) −0.2843 −0.3080 −0.3289
(0.4510) (0.5442) (0.5234)
Observations 264 254 254 218 210 210
R2 0.0322 0.0363 0.0378 0.0324 0.0378 0.0446
Notes: Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standarderrors are clustered byfirmand reported inparentheses: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table B.5
Robustness test: effects of trade regimes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attacks 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Kills 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
ln(Oil Price) −0.0124 0.0533 −0.0334 0.0391
(0.0912) (0.1438) (0.0950) (0.1537)
GDP Growth −0.0714 −0.1330 −0.0850 −0.1442
(0.1522) (0.2256) (0.1479) (0.2226)
S&P 500 0.0001 0.0009 −0.0001 0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
T-bill 0.0002 0.0012 0.0065 0.0057
(0.0106) (0.0149) (0.0125) (0.0182)
Global Consumption −0.0238 −0.0067 −0.0200 −0.0037





Observations 202 202 202 202
R2 0.6110 0.3137 0.6301 0.3239
Notes: Regression includes country fixed effects and linear and quadratic times trends. Standarderrors are clustered byfirmand reported inparentheses: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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